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Ms. Marilyn Branch
Office of the Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

State v. James Dean Classon and Daniel E. Classon. No.
930186-CA

Utah R. App. P. 24(i) Supplemental Authority Letter
Dear Ms. Branch:
Pursuant to rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I
am citing State v. Rex Newman, No. 950208-CA (Utah App. November
29, 1996), as supplemental authority in support of Point I, pp.
11-13, in the State's brief in State v. Classon. I have attached
a copy of the Newman case. Oral argument is set in this matter
for January 21, 1996.
I appreciate your prompt distribution of this letter to the
Court.
Sincerely,

J
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^
THOMAS B. BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
cc:

Margaret P. Lindsay
Kristina M. Neal
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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OPINION
(For Official Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 950208-CA

v.
Rex Newman,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(November 29, 1996)

Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Guy R. Burningham
Attorneys:

Earl Xaiz and Hakeem Ishola, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Wilkins.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant, Rex Newman, appeals a jury verdict convicting him
of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995), and of criminal trespass, a
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206
(1995) . We affirm.
BACKGROUND1
In the summer of 1993, Daniel Wolfe began constructing a
home in Pleasant Grove, Utah, on an empty lot bordering property
owned by Fred Newman. Concerned about the construction's effect
on his property, Fred built a chicken-wire fence on the border
between his property and Wolfe's lot. On July 30, 1993, Wolfe's
subcontractors began excavating for the home's foundation. When
1. We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the jury
verdict. See, e.g.. State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 31 n.2
(Utah App. 1996).

^pp£f^

Wolfe visited his lot that evening, he noticed the subcontractors
had inadvertently piled a large mound of dirt against Fred's
fence. The dirt caused the fence tc bulge in and some of the
dirt had spilled through the fence cr.uo Fred's property. Wolfe
began to move the dirt away from the fence with a trackhoe.
Fred then appeared on Wolfe's property and accused Wolfe of
destroying his fence and demanded that Wolfe stop work. Wolfe
apologized and attempted to explain that he was trying to move
the dirt away from the fence. As Wolfe continued to assure Fred
that he would clean up the fence, Fred left. About ten minutes
later, Fred returned with his brother Don Newman, and both Fred
and Don began yelling taunts and threats at Wolfe. Soon
thereafter, Fred's other brother, Rex Newman, the defendant in
this appeal, arrived and joined his brothers in yelling at Wolfe
and demanded that Wolfe move the dirt with a shovel, instead of
with the trackhoe. To appease the brothers, Wolfe agreed to use
a shovel. As Wolfe walked toward the street to retrieve a shovel
from his truck, however, the brothers blocked his path and
continued shouting.
The confrontation escalated until the three brothers closely
surrounded Wolfe. At some point, defendant yelled, "grab him,"
pulled Wolfe toward him by the shirt, and punched him squarely in
the face. Wolfe crumpled to the ground and nearly lost
consciousness, but was able to grab defendant's knees and pull
him to the ground. Wolfe buried his head into defendant's
stomach, enduring continued blows to the back and front of his
head and to his rib cage. After a few minutes, a police officer
arrived on the scene and broke up the fight.
Wolfe suffered injuries to his nose, requiring two separate
surgeries to correct. Defendant's blow also fractured seven of
Wolfe's teeth, which had to be crowned, and chipped one tooth,
which had to be glued together. All three Newman brothers were
charged with aggravated assault and criminal trespass. All three
were represented by a single attorney, Andrew McCullough. Before
trial, McCullough requested that the Newman brothers' trial be
severed, but the trial court denied this motion. McCullough
expressed his concern about a potential conflict of interest
among his clients, and stated he would discuss this concern with
his clients and perhaps Bar counsel before proceeding further.
During jury voir dire, prospective juror Tom Cryer indicated
that he had been assaulted by his wife's ex-husband, whose last
name was also Newman. In addition, Cryer said that the Mr.
Newman who assaulted him lived in Pleasant Grove and "looks a lot
like" the Newman brothers. The trial court asked Cryer if he
could be impartial despite this experience. Cryer said he could
and acknowledged that "the defendants can't really be responsible
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for the actions of someone that's related to them."
Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately struck Cryer for cause.
At trial, several witnesses testified on behalf of the
Newman brothers, including Don's wife and a nephew. All defense
witnesses gave similar testimony about the encounter. According
to the defense witnesses, defendant hit Wolfe in self-defense,
and at all times, Wolfe was the aggressor. Although trial
counsel indicated during his opening statement that defendant
would testify, Don was the only brother to testify. After a
four-day trial, all three brothers were convicted of criminal
trespass. In addition, Don was convicted of simple assault, and
defendant of aggravated assault.
ISSUES
Defendant's appeal raises the following issues: (1) Did
trial counsel's representation of all three Newman brothers
constitute a conflict of interest which rendered counsel's
representation constitutionally ineffective; and (2) did
potential juror Cryer's comment, concerning a previous encounter
with someone who may have been related to the Newman brothers,
prejudice the entire jury panel such that trial counsel's failure
to move for a mistrial or ask for other curative measures denied
defendant effective assistance of counsel?
Because defendant's ineffectiveness claims arise for the
first time on appeal, without a prior evidentiary hearing, the
claims present a question of law. State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d
584, 591 (Utah App.), cert, granted. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).
However, our review is highly deferential to counsel's trial
decisions to avoid second-guessing tactical considerations. Id.
Conflict of Interest
Defendant first argues that trial counsel's motion to sever
triggered the trial court's duty to ensure that counsel's
representation of all three Newman brothers did not constitute a
conflict of interest. The State counters that the trial court
was not obliged to inquire further about a conflict where counsel
informed the court he would investigate that possibility himself.
Normally, to prevail on a claim that trial counsel's
conflict of interest resulted in constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant "must show that an actual
conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his [or
her] lawyer's performance." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah

App. 1990), denial of habeas aff'd, 853 p.2d 898 (Utah), cert,
denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), denial of habeas aff'd, 67 F.3d
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312 (10th Cir. 1995); accord Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335,
350, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1719 (1980). However, an actual conflict
that adversely affected the lawyer's performance is presumed
under "special circumstances" in which counsel puts the trial
court on notice that a conflict probably exists. Cuyler. 446
U.S. at 346-47, 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
For example, in Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.
Ct. 1173 (1978), defense counsel, representing three
codefendants, moved to sever their trials and for appointment of
separate counsel, on the grounds that he and the defendants
themselves were concerned that their interests were conflicting.
Id. at 478, 98 S. Ct. at 1175. The Holloway Court noted the
following considerations:
[First, a]n "attorney representing two
defendants in a criminal matter is in the
best position professionally and ethically to
determine when a conflict of interest exists
or will probably develop in the course of
trial." Second, defense attorneys have the
obligation, upon discovering a conflict of
interest, to advise the court at once of the
problem. Finally, attorneys are officers of
the court, and lf,when they address the judge
solemnly upon a matter before the court,
their declarations are virtually made under
oath."«
Id. at 485-86, 98 S. Ct. at 1179 (footnotes and citations
omitted). Accordingly, the Court determined that the trial
court's failure to heed counsel's repeatedly-expressed concerns
constituted reversible error, irrespective of whether defendant
had demonstrated any actual conflict or prejudice. Id. at 484-85,
98 S. Ct. at 1178-79.
Nevertheless, under the Holloway rationale, trial courts
generally may rely on counsel to discover and appropriately deal
with any conflicts, in cases involving multiple representation.
Cuyler. 446 U.S. at 346-47, 100 S. Ct. at 1717. Thus, where
counsel makes no objection at trial, the trial court may presume
that no improper conflict due to joint representation is present.
Id. at 348, 100 S. Ct. at 1718; Webb. 790 P.2d at 73. Similarly,
trial courts may rely on counsel's representations that he or she
has or will investigate the possibility of conflicts and notify
the court if any conflict arises. £££ United States v. Kidding.
560 F.2d 1303, 1310 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 872, 98 S.
Ct. 217 (1977).
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... Kidding, defense counsel assur ed the coi n: t that after
jssing joint representation wi t:h his clients, he felt there
would be no conflict, and if any conflict should arise, he would
immediately advise his clients to obtain separate counsel. 1d,
Under these facts, the reviewing court stated it was reasonable
for the trial judge to infer that counsel and his clients had
made an informed decision to proceed with joint representation.
Id. The Kidding court therefore concluded the trial court had no
obligation to delve further into the matter. Id.
Thus, *;.t^ _. . .,; •
_ ,;rney representing more than one
codefendant clearly informs the trial court of "the probable i L LK
of a conflict of interest," there is a presumption that the
codefendants' constitutional right to counsel is compromised.
Holloway. 435 U.S. at 484-85, 98 S. Ct. at 1178-79 (emphasis
added); accord Cuyler. 446 U.S. at 345-46, 100 S. Ct. at 1716Webb. 790 P.2d at 72. In such'special circumstances, if the
trial court fails "either to appoint separate counsel or to take
adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to
warrant separate counsel," the defendants are deprived of their
constitutionally guaranteed assistance of counsel. Holloway, 43 5
U.S. at 484, 98 S. Ct. at 1178; accord Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348,
100 S. Ct. at 1718; J£ebb# 790 P.2d at 72-73. Absent these
special circumstances, however, a defendant can prevail on a
conflict of interest ineffectiveness of counsel claim only by
demonstrating an actual conflict which affected his or her
attorneys performance. Webb, 790 P.2d at 73. A defendant who
makes this showing need not demonstrate prejudice. Id.
In the instant case, trial counsel did not inform the trial
court of a probability of a conflict among the Newman brothers.
Although counsel filed a motion to sever the brothers1 trial,
such a motion would not necessarily have put the court on notice
of an actual conflict. If the alleged actual conflict in this
case--that trial counsel would need to emphasize the other
brothers1 culpability while de-emphasizing defendant's--was a
real danger, the court might have expected counsel to move for
appointment of separate counsel for each codefendant,
More importantly, during arguments* on the motion to se v ei: ,
c o u n s e l indicated that h e would investigate t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a
conflict and would discuss the matter with his clients. Under
these circumstances, the trial court properly relied on counsel's
statements and on counsel's decision to proceed with the multiple
representation. Cf. id. at 74 ("In the absence of other facts or
circumstances that should reasonably bring a conflict of
interests between codefendants to the trial court's attention, we
decline to hold that . . a trial judge "knows or reasonably
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should know1 before or at trial of a conflict suggested in an
abandoned pretrial severance motion.").2
Defendant also argues that the record demonstrates an actual
conflict of interest which affected his representation. To this
end, defendant contends that each Newman brother had varying
defenses and degrees of culpability, that trial counsel did not
refer to defendant frequently enough in opening and closing
statements, and that trial counsel should have called defendant
to testify after earlier stating he would. We agree with the
State, however, that defendant has not shown an actual conflict.
11

In order to show an actual conflict of interest existed, a
defendant must point to specific instances in the record to
suggest an actual conflict or impairment of his or her
interests." Webb. 790 P.2d at 75. However, "hypothetical or
speculative conflicts will not suffice to establish a violation."
State v. Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 923 (Utah App. 1990). This
court has acknowledged that "a substantial disparity of evidence
incriminating each defendant" may, in certain circumstances,
evince an actual conflict. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76 (citing
Armstrong v. People. 701 P.2d 17, 22 (Colo. 1985) (en banc)).
In Armstrong, a husband and wife, represented by a single
attorney, were charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated
robbery, while the husband was separately charged with aggravated
robbery, second degree kidnapping, aggravated car theft, second
degree burglary, and felony theft. 701 P.2d at 18-19. Both
husband and wife were tried together and convicted. Id. at 19.
2. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require federal trial
courts to take a much more active role, in cases of multiple
representation, in investigating possible conflicts and in
advising defendants of their rights regarding separate
representation. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) (requiring trial
courts to scrutinize any case of joint representation and to take
steps necessary to ensure no conflict exists, including
personally advising defendants of their right to effective,
conflict-free counsel). Moreover, some jurisdictions presume
prejudice in any case involving multiple representation, unless
the trial court investigates further or obtains the codefendants1
consent on the record. See, e.g.. Shoncrutsie v. State. 827 P.2d
361, 367 (Wyo. 1992). Nonetheless, these steps are not dictated
by the United States Constitution and have not been adopted by
rule or case law in Utah. Even so, to avoid claims such as
defendant's, when codefendants are represented by a single
attorney, Utah trial courts might consider obtaining consent to
such joint representation on the record. See also State v.
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 924 n.3 (Utah App. 1990).
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*~- Colorado Supreme Court reversed the convictions because
e
-•:-r=it bulk of the evidence introduced at trial was directed
— * ± Ithe husband's] alleged culpability..," and thus "defense
el could not properly refer to the disparate charges of
conduct or comment about this state of the evidence to
„ id. at 22

The instant case is fundamentally disting uishable from
Armstrong. All three Newman brothers were charged essential] y
with the same crimes. In addition, the disparity between what
defendant and his codefendants were convicted of is not nearly so
extreme as the disparities in charges and convictions present in
Armstrong. Thus, the likelihood of a conflict, present in
Armstrong/ in n<""'! present here.
Furthermore, we find
-'~g suspect about choosing the
common, unified defense that Wolfe was the aggressor at all
times. QLs. Holloway. 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S. Ct. at 1178 {»"A
common defense often gives strength against a common attack 'ff
(quoting Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60, 92, 62 S. Ct.
457, 475 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))). This strategy
was consistently adhered to by all defense witnesses, including
codefendant Don Newman. Even on appeal, defendant does not
disparage this defense, but instead simply asserts that counsel
failed adequately to de-emphasize his culpability. We find
defendant's speculative, unsupported contentions in this regard
to be without merit. Cf. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76 ("There is
absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that counselfs choice
of the united defense strategy, which Webb apparently supported
enthusiastically until it produced an unfavorable verdict, was in
any way prompted by a desire or effort to bolster [the
codefendant' s] defense at Webb's expense."); see also Giles v.
State. 877 P.2d 365, 367 (Idaho 1994), cert, denied.
U.S. _ ,
115 S. Ct. 942 (1995) ("Defendants consistently maintained that
they had not committed the acts charged, and there was no
evidence produced to show that they would have changed their
defense strategies if they had had separate attorneys. Thus,
[the codefendants] make no showing of an actual conflict of
interest in the joint representation.").
Defendant's remaining conflict claims rest upon pure
conjecture. For instance, defendant suggests that absent a
conflict of interest, trial counsel would have referred to
defendant more frequently in opening and closing statements. We
fail to see, however, how this alleged shortcoming on counsel's
part compels a conclusion that a conflict of interest existed.
Similarly, deienactnt theorizes that trial counsel somehow
infringed his right to testify. Despite this bare assertion,
defendant cites no record evidence that suggests he wished to
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testify, but was actively prevented from doing so. Absent any
other information, the mere fact that defendant did not testify,
even after counsel initially indicated to the jury that he would,
does not necessarily mean counsel silenced defendant because of a
conflict of interest. On the contrary, the decision that
defendant not testify could have been made for any number of
legitimate tactical reasons.
Moreover, defendant offers no details about what his
testimony would have been. Instead, he relies on this court's
decision in State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991), and
suggests a conflict is manifest whenever a codefendant is not
called to testify. However, Johnson involved a clear conflict
between defense counsel and the defendant, where counsel was
implicated in the same dealings for which the defendant was being
tried. Id. at 486-87. In that limited circumstance, this court
found that counsel1s failure to call defendant to testify was a
factor demonstrating counsel's conflict with his client. Id. at
490. Conversely, there is no special reason in this case to
assume that defendant's failure to testify was a result of a
conflict, as opposed to some other valid consideration. Thus,
the mere fact that defendant did not testify does not establish a
conflict in this case.
Because trial counsel told the court he would investigate
any possible conflicts among the Newman brothers, the court was
not obliged to further explore the matter. Moreover, defendant's
speculation about how trial counsel might have performed
differently and why defendant did not testify does not establish
that counsel labored under an actual conflict which affected his
performance. Therefore, defendant's claim that a conflict of
interest denied him the effective assistance of counsel fails.
Potential Juror's Comment
Defendant claims that his trial counsel ineffectively
responded to prospective juror dryer1s statements that he had
previously been assaulted by someone whose last name was Newman
and who resembled the Newman brothers. Although the trial court
struck Cryer for cause, defendant argues that Cryer's statement
prejudiced the entire jury panel to the extent that any
reasonably prudent attorney would have asked for a mistrial or
curative instruction.
To succeed on this ineffectiveness claim, defendant must
demonstrate both that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that such unreasonable
performance was prejudicial. E.g.. State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d
37, 39 (Utah 1996); Webb. 790 P.2d at 72. To establish
inadequate performance, defendant must overcome a strong
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presumption that legitimate tactical considera;-strategies motivated counsel's actions at trial,

^ .-s
E.g.. State v.

Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Strickland
v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)).

To show prejudice, defendant must demonstrate that "but fox
counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different." Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (citing Strickland, 466 U S

at 688, 694, 104 s. ct. at 2064, 2068); accord State v, Templin,
805 P.2d 182, 186-87 '"^v, ioon\.
In arguing that c~-u-^cl
request a mistrial or
other curative instructions prejudiced his jury, defendant relies
on State v. Ferguson. 618 P.2d 1186 (Kan. 1980). In Ferguson, a
potential juror indicated, during voir dire and in front of the
other panelists, that the State had chosen a good prosecutor for
the case and that the State would not have pressed charges unless
substantial evidence had been collected. Id. at 1193, The
panelist was stricken for cause. Id, Subsequently, the trial
court denied the defense's motion for mistrial, but admonished
the remaining panelists to disregard the dismissed panel member's
remarks and examined the panelists individually to ensure they
could remain impartial. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the
verdict, emphasizing both the trial court's curative precautions
and the notion that a potential juror indicating bias is
generally not grounds for dismissing the entire panel. IsL.
Defendant posits that the Ferguson court would not have
affirmed, absent the trial court's remedial precautions, and that
such remedial precautions or a mistrial were necessary in his
trial, but not requested by his trial counsel. However, the
potential for prejudice in Ferguson--the inference that the
prospective juror knew the prosecutor personally and was vouching
for her credibility--was far more serious than any potential for
prejudice here. In this case, the most any panelist could have
taken from Cryer's comments was that he had been in a fight with
some relative of the Newmans, in a situation wholly unrelated to
the case at hand. Cf. Reynolds v. State. 686 S.W.2d 264, 267-68
(Tex. App. 1985) (finding jury panel not prejudiced where "any
inference which may have been derived from [the potential
juror's] statement of an incident foreign to [defendant's] case
was oblique" and assuming jury followed trial court's standard
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt instructions).
Moreover, Cryer himself conceded that "the defendants can't
really be responsible for their relatives' actions." Thus, the
greater potential for prejudice in Ferguson warranted stronger
precautionary measures than were warranted i n the instant case.
Considering the Isolated and innocuous nature of Cryer's
comments, it was unnecessary for th* *rr •=! court to question <

panel member about bias, and there was no basis for a mistrial.
We must presume then that counsel chose, for tactical reasons,
not to emphasize the comments further by requesting a mistrial or
special instructions. fijL. State v. Wight. 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah
App. 1988) (finding defense counsel's decision to proceed with
murder trial "a legitimate tactical judgement11 where after trial
began, juror stated she knew the victim's wife); see also Boggess
Y, State, 655 P.2d 654, 656 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, because
any additional action was unnecessary, counsel's failure to
request such action could not have prejudiced defendant.
Therefore, defendant's second claim of error fails.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the trial court properly relied on counsel's
representations that he would investigate the possibility of a
conflict of interest among the Newman brothers. The trial court
thus had no duty to delve further into the matter. Moreover,
defendant has failed to show that counsel labored under an actual
conflict of interest which adversely affected his performance.
Finally, counsel's failure to draw undue attention to a
prospective juror's extraneous comments did not constitute
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus,
defendant has not demonstrated that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm his conviction.

Pamela T. Greenwood? Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
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